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Abstract 
 Part I of this two-part article argued that post-constitutional 
developments of the right to support have excluded the largest and 
most vulnerable sector of South African women – African women in 
invalid customary marriages and in intimate partnerships which do not 
resemble monogamous Western nuclear households. Part II explores 
the avenues to develop customary and common law to extend rights to 
support to these women. It argues that the current position 
discriminates against poor, rural African women on multiple 
intersecting grounds, which creates a duty for courts to develop the 
current legal rules. Customary law affords scope for development in 
relation to women in invalid customary marriages. Common law rights 
to support can be extended either ex contractu or ex lege. Because 
contractual support rights are of limited use to poor women, the legacy 
of the majority judgments in Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
(Volks) must be confronted to strengthen the legal basis for an 
automatic duty of support to all women in unmarried intimate 
relationships. The argument in Volks that, women choose to forego 
legal rights by not getting married is criticised. The minority judgment 
in Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC) does, however, create 
potential for overturning this reasoning.  
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1 Introduction 
Part 1 of this article1 set out to show that the post-constitutional avenues for 
extending rights to support to unmarried intimate partners are either based 
on the existence of a marriage recognised by a major religion (in the case 
of Muslim marriages) or on a combination of the marriage-like quality of the 
relationship and undertakings or contracts to provide reciprocal support in 
the case of same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex relationships.  
Using demographical statistics and anthropological studies, I also argued 
that the great majority of South African women, especially the most 
disadvantaged, are unlikely to benefit from these legal developments. As a 
residue of colonial and Apartheid policies African men and women continue 
to be involved in migrant labour, with significant impacts on African families 
including the extremely low rates of marriage amongst this part of the 
population. For the same reason many spouses and intimate partners do 
not share the same households on a permanent basis. Instead people may 
simultaneously be members of multiple households, while multiple long-
term co-existing relationships are relatively common. Nevertheless, rural 
and impoverished African women and their children are particularly 
dependent on financial support from fathers and intimate partners to make 
ends meet. 
The marriage-like qualities of relationships and the public policy arguments 
used in the jurisprudence to justify the extension of legal rights to unmarried 
partners are, however, predicated on a typically Western notion of marriage, 
including permanent cohabitation in the same household and monogamy. A 
large proportion of African women may therefore not qualify for rights to 
support against their intimate partners and may not be able to institute 
dependants' actions for loss of support against third parties who cause the 
death of their breadwinners. 
Other issues which affect only African women arise from the complex nature 
of customary marriages, which take place over longer periods of time and 
involve many different steps. Women may find that their marriages are 
invalid because the requisite steps of the marriage process have not been 
correctly completed or spouses may die after the process has been initiated, 
but before completion. These women have no rights to support because 
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1  See Bonthuys 2018 (Part 1) PELJ 2018(21) 1-32. 
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their marriages are not valid. Furthermore, the co-existence of customary 
and civil marriages or even the existence of multiple customary marriages 
may lead to legal invalidity for one or the other marriage, with the result that 
one of the wives will find herself without legal rights to spousal support. No 
cases have been litigated on these issues and the existing jurisprudence 
does not recognise rights to support in these circumstances. 
Having established the lack of a right to support for these intimate 
partnerships, this part of the paper examines customary and common law 
to establish avenues by which the right to support may be developed so as 
to include all unmarried intimate partners, and not just those whose 
relationships closely resemble common law marriage.  
2 The constitutional duty to extend the right to support to 
all South African unmarried intimate partners 
Where common or customary law unfairly discriminates, section 39(2) of the 
Constitution requires courts to develop the law in order to "promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." The discrimination argument 
was first made in relation to unmarried opposite sex partners in Volks v 
Robinson,2 in which the majority of the Constitutional Court held that the 
failure of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act3 to include unmarried 
intimate partners in the definition of the term "spouse" did not constitute 
impermissible discrimination, nor infringe upon the dignity of the claimant. 
The discrimination argument was based on marital status,4 and it was 
rejected, in the two majority judgments, on two grounds: first, that the special 
position and social importance of the institutions of marriage and the family, 
as recognised in previous Constitutional Court jurisprudence and in 
international law, justify legal differentiation between people who are 
married and those who are unmarried.5 The second ground was the so-
called "choice argument," that: 
[t]he law expects those heterosexual couples who desire the consequences 
ascribed to this type of relationship to signify their acceptance of those 
consequences by entering into a marriage relationship. Those who do not 
wish such consequences to flow from their relationship remain free to enter 
into some other form of relationship and decide what consequences should 
flow from their relationships.6 
                                            
2  Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (hereafter the Volks case). 
3  Section 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
4  Volks case para 12. 
5  Volks case paras 51-57, 80-87. 
6  Volks case paras 92, 58. 
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This part of the article addresses the discrimination argument, making the 
point that the lack of legal rights does not discriminate only or even primarily 
upon the basis of marital status, but that it provides a classical instance of 
intersectional discrimination on the bases of marital status, sex, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, culture, socio-economic status and race.  
2.1 Intersecting grounds of discrimination 
Substantive gender equality – as opposed to formally treating everybody 
the same - requires courts to consider the actual conditions of women's 
lives, to focus on the needs of the most disadvantaged women and to 
acknowledge the impact of past and current legal regimes on the most 
vulnerable women.7  
The value of non-sexism is foundational to our Constitution and requires a 
hard look at the reality of the lives that women have been compelled to lead 
by law and legally-backed social practices. This, in turn, necessitates 
acknowledging the constitutional goal of achieving substantive equality 
between men and women. The reality has been and still in large measure 
continues to be that in our patriarchal culture men find it easier than women 
to receive income and acquire property.8 
The real social conditions facing the majority of South African women9 are 
that they are disadvantaged vis-à-vis men in relation to access to education 
and employment, earning capacity and land ownership. In addition, women 
bear the lion's share of caring responsibilities towards children and other 
vulnerable family members. The effect of the lack of a legal duty of support 
between intimate partners is that women are not entitled to economic 
contributions from their partners towards their own maintenance or that of 
the common household (if there is a common household). This renders 
women vulnerable during the subsistence of their relationships because, in 
the absence of legal rights, they must rely on their partners' benevolence 
towards them and this, in turn, may force them to endure physical and 
sexual violence rather than to take legal action against abusive partners. 
Because women have no legal rights to support after the termination of their 
relationships, they may have to remain in abusive relationships or face 
homelessness and economic destitution. Together with the absence of 
rights to share in partnership property, this means that older women who 
have spent many years taking care of their partners and their children, and 
who, as a result, have no careers or marketable skills, will be left destitute 
                                            
7  Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR; Albertyn 2007 SAJHR. 
8  Sachs J in Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC) (hereafter the Daniels case) 
para 22. 
9  See para 2 of part 1 of this article.  
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and will not be compensated for their contributions to their relationships. 
Furthermore, if relationships end as a result of the death of their partners, 
destitute women have no financial claims against the estates of their 
deceased partners, and they also have no rights to sue those who 
wrongfully caused their partners' death.  
The absence of legal rights to support arguably constitutes unfair 
discrimination on four grounds: gender, race, marital status and sexual 
orientation. 
The differentiation between married and unmarried women and, in some 
instances, between women married in terms of customary law and those 
who are married in civil law, illustrates the intersectional nature of the 
discrimination. First, this distinction between married and unmarried women 
unfairly discriminates on the basis of marital status by denying rights which 
are available to married women to unmarried women. A second argument 
is that the distinction between women married in terms of civil law and 
customary wives also indirectly discriminates on the basis of race by 
perpetuating the legal neglect of customary wives - a hallmark of the 
Apartheid legal system. A third basis for arguing discrimination on the basis 
of marital status and possibly also religion or belief is the legal differences 
between different groups of unmarried women. Women married in terms of 
Muslim law, but whose monogamous and polygynous marriages are 
technically not valid, have, as a result of the recognition of the Islamic 
marriage contract in case law, acquired rights to support pendente lite10 
after divorce11 against third parties who cause the death of their 
breadwinners,12 and in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act.13 These rights are not available for women in all other forms of intimate 
relationships. 
Another axis of discrimination is sexual orientation. The successful litigation 
strategy on behalf of same-sex cohabitants means that certain duties of 
support have been extended to same-sex couples,14 but not to opposite sex 
couples. In other respects, like the dependant's action, same- and opposite-
                                            
10  AM v RM 2010 2 SA 223 (ECP); Hoosein v Dangor 2010 2 All SA 55 (WCC). 
11  Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T); Rose v Rose 2015 2 All SA 352 (WCC). 
12  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA). 
13  Daniels case.  
14  Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T); Satchwell v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter the Satchwell 
case). 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 6 
sex cohabitants have similar rights to support.15 Extending rights to 
cohabiting same-sex couples was often justified by referring to their inability 
to enter into legal marriage, but with the adoption of the Civil Union Act, this 
difference has been abolished – at least formally. Yet neither statute nor 
case law have subsequently withdrawn the fruits of the litigation from same-
sex couples.16  
These grounds of discrimination, namely gender, race, religion, culture, 
sexual orientation and marital status intersect in particular ways, reflecting 
the distinctive patterns of advantage and disadvantage associated with 
colonialism and Apartheid. The selective favouring of certain relationships 
and families over others, and of certain family members over others is 
neither co-incidental nor value neutral. Instead they ensure that the 
distribution of material goods, decisions about establishing or ending 
relationships, authority and decision-making within relationships, the 
distribution of work and responsibilities within relationships and, 
consequently, social and economic vulnerability within and after 
relationships favour men over women, white people over those who are not 
white, those who adhere to Judeo-Christian family patterns over others, and 
heterosexuals over those who have relationships with others of the same 
sex. In effect, the various grounds upon which rights are either allocated or 
denied to women in particular relationships create and reinforce those 
patriarchal, heterosexist, religious and racial hierarchies upon which 
colonial and Apartheid domination were grounded.17  
The intersectional nature of discrimination on the bases of marital status, 
gender and race was recognised by Justice O'Regan in the Harksen case18 
and Justice Sachs in Volks, who pointed out that "it is women rather than 
men who in general suffered disadvantage because of their status of being 
married or not married" and that the Apartheid disregard of certain 
marriages and certain familial relationships had profoundly racist effects.19  
These judgments are, unfortunately, exceptions in the South African family 
law jurisprudence, which generally prefers to focus on a single ground of 
discrimination, or to use an "add on model" of discrimination, according to 
which poor, black women experience racial discrimination in the same way 
                                            
15  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) (hereafter the Du Plessis 
case); Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) (hereafter Paixão SCA). 
16  Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC); Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC) 
(hereafter the Laubscher case). 
17  Bonthuys 2016 OSLS 1309-1311, 1313. 
18  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) paras 64, 93-96, 121-124. 
19  Volks case paras 199 and 206. 
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as black men, and gender discrimination similarly to economically privileged 
white women. This is not only inaccurate, but it means that courts thereby 
endorse essentialist views which take the experiences of the most 
advantaged members of the disadvantaged groups as the paradigm for 
everyone. In effect, the ways in which black men experience racism is 
essentialised and generalised as the experiences of all black people, and 
the experiences of privileged white women are regarded as the prototype 
for sexism. It is this way of thinking which allowed the majority of the court 
in Volks to argue that there was no discrimination on the basis of marital 
status because people could choose to access legal and material benefits 
by getting married.20 In reality, however, the choices of privileged white 
women to marry or cohabit are not the same as those of impoverished rural 
African women, and the choices of African men to enter into multiple 
relationships or polygynous customary marriages are not the choices 
available to African women. A proper intersectional analysis of the various 
forms of discrimination and a serious consideration of the real contexts of 
the most disadvantaged rural African women are ways to circumvent the 
choice argument, to which this article turns in more detail in paragraph 4 
below.  
However, despite having a duty to develop discriminatory rules of common 
and customary law, courts also recognise certain constraints, articulated by 
Cloete JA in Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund21 and applicable to both 
customary and common law alike:  
Judges should be mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform 
should be the Legislature and not the Judiciary…the Judiciary should confine 
itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common 
law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society. 
In part I of the article I discussed the potential of the Draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill to alleviate the plight of disadvantaged unmarried intimate 
partners. I intimated that these women would generally be in unregistered 
partnerships, which don't afford automatic rights to support during 
relationships, but that after the end of the relationships, rights to support 
may be granted by courts. The extent of the right to support would therefore 
be limited and, moreover, it is not clear whether courts would generously 
interpret the criteria for unregistered partnerships to include women who do 
not fit the standard nuclear family and shared household model associated 
with Western marriage. While it may be strategic to lobby for the adoption 
                                            
20  Bonthuys 2008 Can J Women & L 26-27. 
21  Du Plessis case 36. 
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of the Draft Bill, it may also be necessary to expand the definition of 
unregistered partnerships and the extent of rights to support in terms of the 
legislation. In any event, Parliament has not passed this legislation in the 
twelve years since its recommendation by the Law Reform Commission and 
it therefore becomes necessary to investigate the development of 
customary and common law rules instead.  
3 Customary law 
When courts are called upon to develop customary law there are particular 
considerations which result from the limited recognition given to customary 
law in colonial and Apartheid times and the fact that these rules were 
codified and administered by people who not only failed to grasp the value 
system underlying the rules, but who often treated customary law and its 
subjects with disdain.22 In applying and adapting customary rules, therefore, 
courts: 
must remain mindful that an important objective of our constitutional enterprise 
is to be 'united in our diversity.' In its desire to find social cohesion, our 
Constitution protects and celebrates difference. It goes far in guaranteeing 
cultural, religious and language practices in generous terms provided that they 
are not inconsistent with any right in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, it bears 
repetition that it is a legitimate object to have a flourishing and constitutionally 
compliant customary law that lives side by side with the common law and 
legislation.23 
This entails that customary law should not merely be replaced with civil law 
rules, but that any developments of customary law should respect and give 
effect to the underlying values of the rules, even as they reflect current 
practices of customary communities.  
In part I of this article24 I highlighted those aspects of customary marriage 
which expose African women to the risk of finding themselves in the position 
of unmarried cohabitants without legal rights to property or support when 
they discover that their customary marriages are invalid. These include 
complicated and drawn-out marriage processes, the risk of invalidity of 
simultaneous customary and civil marriages and the requirements for 
polygynous customary marriages. In addition, customary marriages are 
                                            
22  Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) (hereafter 
the Gumede case) paras 17, 20. 
23  Gumede case para 22. 
24  Part I para 2. 
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often unregistered, which leaves women unable to prove the existence of 
valid marriages, and therefore practically without legal recourse.25  
None of the cases declaring such customary marriages invalid have 
extended legal relief to those women who have for years conducted 
themselves as wives. One relatively simple legal development would be the 
extension of the doctrine of putative marriage from common law to 
customary marriage to give wives access to property which was 
accumulated during the marriage.26 Putative marriages do not, however, 
create duties of spousal support.  
Due to the marriage-like nature of these relationships and the fact that a 
marriage (although invalid) was conducted, it may also be possible to litigate 
for the extension of rights to support on the basis that such rights have been 
extended to Muslim marriages and marriage-like same-sex relationships. 
The choice argument in the Volks case would not preclude such claims, but 
may actually assist such women because they clearly chose to be married, 
while the invalidity of their marriages is not usually due to factors within the 
women's control. 
The other category of women in need of support is those who never went 
through a marriage ceremony, but who have long-term, intimate 
relationships with men. These relationships may sometimes co-exist with 
other intimate relationships or with customary or civil law marriages, and the 
women may or may not be aware of the existence of multiple relationships.27 
The question is whether a court would be inclined to develop the customary 
law to create a duty of support for these women.  
Courts may well be reluctant to do so. First, there appear to be no cases 
nor any academic authority awarding or recognising rights to spousal 
support to cohabitants in customary law. Indeed, the clear customary 
principle appears to be that without marriage a woman does not become 
part of a man's family, even though the relationship may be of long standing. 
The man's family and the man himself have no duty to support such a 
woman. This also accords with the views of informants on customary 
                                            
25  See part I para 2 and the references it contains. 
26  The suggestion has been made by Mwambene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica and 
Janse van Rensburg 2003 TSAR. 
27  See part I para 2 and the references it contains. 
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practices, who insist that cohabiting women have no rights to support from 
men's families and that they will not receive support after a man dies.28  
A second problem arises when maintenance is claimed after the unmarried 
intimate partnership has ended. Customary law did not originally recognise 
duties of support, even between spouses, after the marriage had ended.29 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act allows a court to make an 
order for spousal support at divorce, but the literature indicates that these 
orders are rare and seldom adhered to.30 This, in relation to customary 
marriages, further diminishes the chances of holding that there is a duty to 
support after the end of a non-marital relationship.  
Third, when customary and civil marriages co-exist, section 31(1) of the 
Black Administration Act and section 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act extinguish or limit the rights of certain customary wives to 
maintenance. These rules are remnants of the historical favouring of civil 
marriages over customary marriages and they are probably 
unconstitutional. However, what is relevant for this particular article is that, 
if there are no duties of spousal support in customary marriages which co-
exist with civil marriages, then it's very unlikely that courts would award such 
rights in unmarried relationships which co-exist with civil marriages, or 
perhaps even with valid customary marriages. Nevertheless, there are 
precedents for extending rights to support in polygynous Muslim 
marriages31 and in unmarried opposite-sex relationships,32 which could 
support an argument in favour of extending rights to other polygynous 
relationships also. 
There are two customary practices which could be explored for further legal 
development. The first relates to the payment of the compensatory isondlo 
beast in relation to women's work in providing care for children of the 
relationship. The practice of isondlo is already recognised by section 8(4)(e) 
of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, which allows a court which 
makes a maintenance order in a customary divorce to "take into account 
any provision or arrangement made in accordance with customary law".33 It 
could be argued that a man has a duty to compensate a woman for her 
                                            
28  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 91; Budlender et al Women, 
Land and Customary Law 33, 36, 38. 
29  Bennett Customary Law 282-284. 
30  Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage 211-214. 
31  The Hoosein, Khan and Rose cases. 
32  Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) (hereinafter the SCA Paixão 
case. 
33  Bennett Customary Law 284. 
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childcare work by using the analogy of the isondlo beast. However, a man 
cannot be compelled to pay isondlo, and courts would rather, in those 
circumstances, order child maintenance. Moreover, the isondlo beast is not 
paid to the woman herself, but to her family. I have also not found any 
evidence of such an extended use of isondlo in customary communities, so 
this avenue may fail.  
A final possibility is to explore mechanisms to secure women's rights to 
remain on the land on which their houses are situated, at least for the 
duration of their lives. This could be done either through customary 
mechanisms for land tenure or through exploring compensation for the 
improvements which the woman had made on the land. The benefit of this 
approach would be that – if successful – it would represent an incremental 
increase of the rights of cohabitants, but one which would nevertheless have 
real practical and economic value for women who may otherwise lose their 
homes when their intimate relationships end.  
4 Common law 
In his minority judgment in Volks, Justice Sachs held that there are two 
groups of cohabitants whose duties to support one another deserve legal 
protection:34  
The first would be where the parties have freely and seriously committed 
themselves to a life of interdependence marked by express or tacit 
undertakings to provide each other with emotional and material support. 
In this group the legal duty of support is based upon the recognition and 
enforcement of the parties' undertakings or agreements: in effect, their 
contracts to support one another. In the second group the law recognises 
that the duty arises:35  
from the nature of the particular life partnership itself. The critical factor will be 
whether the relationship was such as to produce dependency for the party 
who, in material terms at least, was the weaker and more vulnerable one (and 
who, in all probability, would have been unable to insist that the deceased 
enter into formal marriage). The reciprocity would be based on care and 
concern rather than on providing equal support in material or financial terms. 
The duty of support can therefore arise either ex contractu (the first 
scenario) or ex lege (the second instance).36 I shall examine each in turn.  
                                            
34  Volks case para 214. 
35  Volks case para 218. 
36  Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR 477. 
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4.1 Rights ex contractu 
The recent jurisprudence creates the impression that, outside of marriage, 
contract is the only basis upon which a duty of support between intimate 
partners will be recognised. This interpretation rests upon the dictum by 
Skweyiya J in Volks that "no duty of support arises by operation of law in 
the case of unmarried cohabitants".37 As a result of this judgment, the 
jurisprudence on the duty to support outside of marriage has become more 
overtly reliant on contract, even as remnants of public policy reasoning 
continue to influence courts' determination of whether or not the partners 
actually agreed to support one another.38 
Contract appears to be an appropriate and expedient way to circumvent the 
strictures of Volks, because South African family law has traditionally 
allowed spouses to determine the property consequences of their marriages 
by way of antenuptial contracts. Engagements are also regarded as 
contracts, albeit subject to sui generis rules and remedies.39 In addition, 
Muslim marriages, which apply to many of the cases in this area, are often 
characterised as contracts between the spouses.40  
Indeed, the voluntary nature of marriage often leads to its being described 
as a contract, but this is not accurate41 because the consequences of 
marriage extend far beyond what the spouses agree upon. In fact, those 
very same judgments which afford primacy to marriage over other family 
forms do not rely upon pacta sunt servanda, but recognise instead the 
importance of the many complex social functions which marriage fulfils. The 
majority judgment of Skweyiya in Volks quotes at length42 from the Dawood 
case, in which O'Regan explained the significance of marriage as follows:43  
The institutions of marriage and the family are important social institutions that 
provide for the security, support and companionship of members of our society 
and bear an important role in the rearing of children. The celebration of a 
marriage gives rise to moral and legal obligations, particularly the reciprocal 
duty of support placed upon spouses and their joint responsibility for 
supporting and raising children born of the marriage. These legal obligations 
perform an important social function. 
                                            
37  Volks case para 56. 
38  For more detailed exposition see para 3.3.2 of part I of this article.  
39  Heaton and Kruger South African Family Law ch 2. 
40  Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A); Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C); Hoosein 
case para 16. 
41  Heaton and Kruger South African Family Law 13. 
42  Volks case para 56. 
43  Volks case para 31. 
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The disjuncture between family law and contract law reflects the difference 
between status and contract,44 with family law regarded as status-based in 
the sense that legal rights and duties are ascribed to people on the basis of 
their status as wives, husbands or children - whether or not they agree to it. 
In contract law, by way of contrast, rights and duties derive from agreement. 
The adoption of contract as a mechanism to evade the consequences of the 
Volks judgment creates internal inconsistencies within family law, because 
the rules, precedents, assumptions and methods of proof associated with 
commercial contracts are oftentimes at odds with the ethos and underlying 
principles of family law.45 An uneasy mix of status- and contract-related 
policies and rules has led to confusion about various aspects of the 
contracts to support which could hamper the ability of intimate partners to 
prove that there was a contract to support. In this paragraph I explore 
different facets of this problem. 
4.1.1 Proving a contract to support 
The contract to support can be concluded either expressly (i.e. in writing or 
verbally) or tacitly.46 In Muslim marriages there would generally be an 
express marriage contract, while in the case of unmarried same- and 
opposite sex partners, agreements are most often tacit.  
The party who relies on a contract bears the onus to prove it. To prove an 
express contract, a party must either produce and prove a document, or 
produce evidence of an oral agreement. The latter could take the form of 
oral testimony by the party or other witnesses, evidence of surrounding 
circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the contract and evidence of 
the parties' behaviour, both at the time of conclusion and while the contract 
was allegedly in force.47 A court should find that an oral contract was 
concluded if this is the more probable inference from all the evidence.  
Contracts between intimate partners to provide mutual support would rarely 
be written down. Although they may be verbal, they would more often be 
tacit. Tacit contracts are most difficult to prove,  because of courts' traditional 
reluctance to accept allegations of tacit terms.48 Problems of proof increase 
                                            
44  See Graveson 1941 MLR. 
45  See Dewar 2000 IJLPF. 
46  Volks case paras 136, 140, 214; Paixão SCA paras 17, 18. 
47  De Lange v Absa Makelaars 2010 3 All SA 403 (SCA) para 21. 
48  Wilkins v Voges 1994 3 SA 130 (A) 143H-I. 
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when a party alleges not only a tacit term in an otherwise express contract, 
but that the entire contract had been tacitly concluded:49 
In order to establish a tacit contract it is necessary to show, by a 
preponderance of probabilities, unequivocal conduct which is capable of no 
other reasonable interpretation than that the parties intended to, and did in 
fact, contract on the terms alleged. It must be proved that there was in fact 
consensus ad idem. 
Within the family context, where people have moral, social and even 
religious obligations to behave in certain ways, and where they also act out 
of affection and altruistic motives, it becomes understandably difficult to 
prove that a contract to support is the only reasonable explanation for 
partners' behaviour. Basing the duty of support on contracts – and 
especially tacit contracts – therefore presents inherent obstacles to proving 
the existence of such a duty.50  
4.1.2 Animus contrahendi and mere undertakings 
The basis for the legal enforcement of a contract is agreement between the 
parties (consensus), which is accompanied by animus contrahendi – the 
intention to enter into a legally binding contract. Animus contrahendi 
distinguishes a contract from a mere social arrangement or moral obligation, 
which can't be legally enforced.51 Parties to intimate relationships make 
many promises to one another, but only those which are made animo 
contrahendi are enforceable as contracts. While non-contractual social or 
moral obligations cannot be directly enforced, they may inform public policy, 
boni mores and the legal convictions of the community which may, in turn, 
influence a court's reasoning on the existence of an ex lege duty of support.  
The jurisprudence on agreements to support one another is not always clear 
on whether the parties have animus contrahendi or have merely 
"undertaken" to support one another.52 For instance, the word "contract" is 
not once mentioned in the Satchwell judgment, which speaks instead of 
"undertaking" duties of support,53 while Du Plessis contains both the terms 
"undertake"54 and "contract".55 The latest cases tend to move towards a 
                                            
49  Standard Bank of SA v Ocean Commodities 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 292B-C. 
50  See Bonthuys 2017 SALJ. 
51  Church of the Province of Southern Africa, Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA 2002 3 SA 
385 (LCC). 
52  See the discussion in para 3.3.2 of part I of this article.  
53  Satchwell case paras 24, 25, 37. 
54  Du Plessis case paras 14, 16. 
55  Du Plessis case paras 6, 16, 37. 
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more explicitly contractual terminology,56 which may signify a shift in courts' 
reasoning on duties of support from public policy or boni mores towards 
contract. However, this shift is not complete, because the issue of animus 
contrahendi has not yet been settled. While some cases simply assume the 
existence of animus (by assuming that there is a contract), other cases like 
Meyer57 and Paixão a quo58 have held that agreements between intimate 
partners are merely moral or social in nature because of the lack of 
animus:59  
Experience has taught us that people make promises, not intending that those 
promises should be construed or elevated to animus contrahendi. 
The developing jurisprudence on universal partnership contracts between 
unmarried partners may indicate an increasing acceptance of the idea of 
binding contracts between people in intimate relationships,60 but this 
requirement places an additional burden upon women who allege a contract 
of reciprocal support with their intimate partners. Not only do they have to 
prove that they actually agreed with their partners, but that both understood 
that they would have legal recourse against one another if their agreement 
were breached. This constitutes an impediment for legal claims for support 
outside of marriage.  
4.1.3  Public policy and simultaneous relationships 
Another problem which emerges from the established jurisprudence on 
contracts between family members is the issue of intimate relationships 
which co-exist with marriages. In order to be valid a contract should be legal, 
and contracts which create rights for intimate partners while one of the 
contracting parties is already married to someone else would be regarded 
as contrary to public policy and thus void for illegality.61 A contract whereby 
a married man undertakes to provide spousal support to a woman who is 
not his wife should therefore be invalid.  
                                            
56  Verheem v Road Accident Fund 2010 2 SA 409 (GP) (hereafter the Verheem case) 
paras 2, 12; McDonald v Young 2012 3 SA 1 (SCA) (hereafter the MacDonald case) 
para 16; Paixão SCA para 22. 
57  Meyer v Road Accident Fund (TPD) (unreported) case number 29950/2004 of 28 
March 2006 (hereafter the Meyer case) paras 38, 39. 
58  Paixao v Road Accident Fund 2011 ZAGPJHC 68 (1 July 2011) (hereafter Paixão a 
quo) paras 30 31, 35. 
59  Paixão a quo para 30. 
60  Bonthuys 2016 OSLS. 
61  Staples v Marquard 1919 CPD 181; Friedman v Harris 1928 CPD 43; Karp v Kuhn 
1948 4 SA 825 (T); Claassen v Van der Watt 1969 3 SA 68 (T); Lloyd v Mitchell 2004 
2 All SA 542 (C); Benefeld v West 2011 2 SA 379 (GSJ). 
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This was the basis for the decision in Paixão a quo that  
[i]t cannot be argued successfully that promises made during the 
subsistence of a marriage relationship can prevail over the marital 
obligations of the other spouse.62  
The Supreme Court of Appeal's attempt in Paixão to bypass this conclusion 
by characterising the contract as "akin to a pactum de contrahendo"63 is 
unconvincing because pacta de contrahendo must also comply with the 
usual rules on legality. If the main agreement, which the pactum de 
contrahendo anticipates is illegal, then the pactum itself must likewise fail.64  
The only way around the issue of legality would have been for the Supreme 
Court of Appeal to overrule the established common law rule that an 
agreement to support by a married person is illegal because it undermines 
the institution of marriage. However, this would have involved a radical 
break with precedent.  
Support for altering or abolishing this rule on legality can, however, be found 
in the cases on polygynous Muslim marriages. In Khan v Khan the court 
upheld a claim for maintenance after a talaaq (divorce) was issued in a 
polygynous Muslim marriage, holding that the duty to maintain was legally 
enforceable, despite the polygynous nature of the marriage, because of 
changes in public policy towards potentially polygynous marriages.65 
Moreover, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and several cases 
had recognised the rights of women in polygynous customary marriages to 
support.66 Therefore:67 
the argument that it is contra bonos mores to grant a Muslim wife, married in 
accordance with Islamic rites, maintenance where the marriage is not 
monogamous, can no longer hold water. It will be blatant discrimination to 
grant, in the one instance, a Muslim wife in a monogamous Muslim marriage 
a right to maintenance, but to deny a Muslim wife married in terms of the same 
Islamic rites (which are inherently polygamous) and who has the same faith 
and beliefs as the one in the monogamous marriage, a right to maintenance. 
While the Khan case involved simultaneous Islamic marriages, the Islamic 
marriage in Rose v Rose was concluded at a time when the man was 
already a spouse in a civil marriage. The two marriages overlapped for a 
period of ten years, after which the civil marriage was dissolved. Brembridge 
                                            
62  Paixão a quo paras 29, 40 and 41. 
63  Paixão SCA para 22. 
64  Brandt v Spies 1960 4 SA 14 (E). 
65  Khan case para 11, relying on the Amod case. 
66  Khan case para 11.10. 
67  Khan case para 11.11. 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 17 
AJ68 cited the dictum from Hassam v Jacobs which declared it impermissible 
to discriminate between monogamous and polygynous Muslim marriages: 
[t]he significance attached to polygynous unions solemnised in accordance 
with the Muslim religious faith is by no means less than the significance 
attached to a civil marriage under the Marriage Act or an African 
customary marriage. Similarly, the dignity of the parties to polygynous Muslim 
marriages is no less worthy of respect than the dignity of parties to civil 
marriages or African customary marriages.69 
This, the court in Rose held, meant that the pre-existing civil marriage 
rendered the subsequent Islamic marriage polygynous, but it did not prevent 
the Muslim spouse from claiming legal relief in terms of the Divorce Act.70 
The application of the Hassam case in this decision is open to criticism, 
because Hassam involved co-existing Muslim marriages, while in Rose the 
Muslim marriage was concluded after a valid civil marriage. The principle in 
Hassam may therefore not be directly transferable to the facts in Rose.  
The comparison to customary marriages in the quote from Hassam may 
also not be directly applicable to the issue of co-existing civil and customary 
or Islamic marriages. Historically customary marriages were invalidated 
when one of the parties entered into a civil marriage with another person, 
signifying both the superior status of civil marriage and the wish to maintain 
the essentially monogamous nature of civil marriage.71 Currently no 
customary marriage can be concluded during the subsistence of a valid civil 
marriage to another spouse, nor a civil marriage to a third party while a valid 
customary marriage subsists.72 Extended to Islamic marriages, this 
reasoning would entail that contractual undertakings could be contrary to 
public policy if enforcing them would undermine the integrity of civil 
marriages, which are in principle strictly monogamous.  
It is further notable that the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill73 determines 
that all registered partnerships (which would create ex lege rights and duties 
of support) may not co-exist with civil marriages or civil unions or with other 
registered partnerships. In addition, courts will not be able to extend rights 
to support in unregistered partnerships which co-exist with either civil 
marriages, civil unions or registered domestic partnerships. By implication, 
duties of support could be granted in relationships which co-exist with 
                                            
68  Khan case para 56. 
69  Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) (hereafter the Hassam case) para 46. 
70  Rose case para 58. 
71  Bennett Customary Law 236-242. 
72  Sections 10(4) and 3(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1990. 
73  See para 3.3.3 of part I of this article. 
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customary marriages, Muslim marriages or unregistered domestic 
partnerships. In this respect the Draft Bill corresponds with contractual rules 
which uphold the monogamous nature of civil marriage. 
It appears that the existence of a civil marriage with another woman may 
render any agreement to support the client invalid for being contrary to 
public policy. This would limit the usefulness of a contractual right to support 
for women whose partners are in simultaneous civil marriages.  
4.1.4 Contractual rights and duties after conjugal relationships have ended 
In Volks Skweyiya J held that:74  
[t]o the extent that any obligations arise between cohabitants during the 
subsistence of their relationship, these arise by agreement and only to the 
extent of that agreement. The Constitution does not require the imposition of 
an obligation on the estate of a deceased person, in circumstances where the 
law attaches no such obligation during the deceased's lifetime, and there is 
no intention on the part of the deceased to undertake such an obligation. 
This case dealt with the continued existence of a duty of support against the 
estate of a deceased partner. It is less clear whether a contract-based right 
to support can be asserted against a third party who caused the death of a 
breadwinner by way of the dependant's action. As the Amod case held, this 
question would be determined by the boni mores and in Amod the 
dependant's action was in fact extended to the contractual duty of support 
which arose from a monogamous Islamic marriage. The action has also 
been afforded to unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants who had contracted 
to support one another in the Paixão and Du Plessis cases. However, 
whether or not courts would be prepared to extend it further to unmarried 
intimate partners who do not necessarily cohabit remains to be seen, even 
when they had undertaken a reciprocal duty of support. 
The next question is whether the contractual duty of support continues after 
the end of the intimate relationship, but while the defendant is still alive. In 
other words, can the contractual duty of support still be enforced against a 
partner even after the relationship has broken down? The answer will 
depend on the terms of the tacit contract – whether a court will find that the 
parties agreed that the defendant undertook to support the plaintiff for the 
duration of the relationship only, or that the support would continue after the 
end of the relationship.  
                                            
74  Volks case para 58. 
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The latter interpretation is very unlikely because, even within marriage, the 
duty of support ends when the marriage is terminated by divorce unless it is 
extended by way of a court order or settlement agreement. When a marriage 
ends as a result of death, the duty of support is likewise terminated unless 
the application of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act causes it to 
continue.  
None of the recent cases extending contractual duties of support outside of 
marriage has afforded a right to claim support against a living partner after 
the relationship has ended, except for the cases involving Islamic marriages 
in which the duty to maintain for the iddaah period is expressly stipulated in 
the Muslim marriage contract. In McDonald v Young the claim for post-
relationship maintenance failed – not on the basis of principle, but because 
the contract was not proven. However, outside of Islamic marriage, 
recognising a duty to support when a relationship ended would require 
either a radical development of the law or an express (and probably written) 
contract. Tacit contracts, which are difficult to prove in any event, would 
probably not be able to achieve this. 
4.1.5 Autonomy and bargaining power in contracts to support 
Unlike ex lege remedies, which are automatically available to all those who 
meet certain criteria, contractual remedies are individualised in the sense 
that only those people who can prove the existence of a contract can claim 
support. Whether or not people can prove contracts, especially oral and tacit 
contracts, would depend on the individual circumstances of each case. The 
very notion of contract is therefore intrinsically more onerous for the party 
alleging a legal duty of support than an ex lege duty. Moreover, in order to 
prove a contract, an individual woman would need to approach a court – 
something which is not within the financial reach of all women, especially 
those who most need support. It is for these reasons that Goldblatt75 has 
criticised the the Supreme Court of Appeal's Amod judgment: 
[b]y relying more narrowly on the contract between the parties, the judgment 
makes it harder for partners in intimate relationships to prove a legally 
enforceable duty of support so as to bring themselves within the scope of the 
dependant's action. A finding that the duty of support was a common-law 
consequence of certain, previously unrecognised family relationships would 
have meant that the dependant's action would have been automatically 
available to such families. 
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There is a deep irony in the courts' turning to contract to get around the 
choice argument in Volks. The central concept of contract and the main 
justification for legally enforcing contracts – consensus or voluntary 
agreement between the parties – in essence replicates elements of the very 
choice argument upon which the majority judgment in Volks was based. 
This means that all the improbable assumptions about individual autonomy 
and the ability of people to choose to advance their own interests, which are 
criticised in the Volks majority judgment, also apply to remedies based on 
contract. This is exacerbated by the fact that the law of contract and its rules, 
precedents and methods of proof are generally tailored to the commercial 
context. Agreements between family members and people in intimate 
relationships tend to be guided by different, often gendered norms of 
behaviour such as trust, altruism and a concern for mutual benefit rather 
than the ability to make a profit. This means that those, often women, who 
act according to altruistic norms tend to be disadvantaged when their 
behaviour is measured against the standards which were formulated for 
business contracts.  
The next paragraph turns to the implications of the Volks judgment for the 
development of an ex lege right to support. 
4.2 Ex lege rights to support and the choice argument 
Although an ex lege duty of support would be preferable to a duty based on 
contract, the unequivocal statement in Volks76 that "no duty of support arises 
by operation of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants" appears to have 
closed this avenue.  
The judgment provides two justifications for this view. The first is that the 
Constitution and international law recognise the family as the basis for 
society. Differentiation between married and unmarried families is therefore 
justified and cannot amount to unfair discrimination.77 The second 
justification, which amplifies the first, is the choice argument, that:78 
[t]he law expects those heterosexual couples who desire the consequences 
ascribed to this type of relationship to signify their acceptance of those 
consequences by entering into a marriage relationship. Those who do not 
wish such consequences to flow from their relationship remain free to enter 
into some other form of relationship and decide what consequences should 
flow from their relationships. 
                                            
76  Volks case para 56. 
77  Volks case paras 51-57, 76-79. 
78  Volks case para 92 per Ncgobo J. 
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The unfair discrimination argument has been dealt with extensively by 
academic commentators.79 The minority judgments point out that it both 
nullifies the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital 
status80 and "presupposes and eliminates the very issue which needs to be 
determined".81 It could further be countered by the argument that the lack of 
legal remedies for opposite-sex partners discriminates on the basis of 
sexual orientation,82 and is replaced by an intersectional discrimination 
analysis, the outlines of which I sketched.83  
In the remainder of this article I shall therefore focus on the use of the choice 
argument. I preface this discussion by observing that elevating choice over 
other considerations is foreign to family law, which has always imposed 
legal obligations against the wishes of family members; for instance, 
imposing maintenance obligations on reluctant parents and ex-spouses.84  
4.2.1 Selective use of the choice argument  
The fact that same-sex couples could not exercise the choice to marry their 
preferred partners was central to the extension of a range of marriage-like 
rights to these relationships.85 In fact, their lack of choice was regarded as 
an affront to their dignity:86  
to deny same-sex couples a choice in this respect is to negate their right to 
self-definition in a most profound way. 
By comparison, the absence of the choice argument in several of the Muslim 
marriage cases87 is therefore remarkable. None of these cases denied 
rights to Muslim spouses because they had the choice to conclude civil 
marriages in addition to their religious marriages – something which many 
Muslim couples actually do. The absence of the choice argument implies 
that Muslim couples don't have a choice to enter into civil marriage. These 
cases correspond with the Constitutional Court's view in Hassam v Jacobs 
                                            
79  MacConnachie 2015 SAJHR; Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR. 
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that Muslim wives have no influence over their husbands' choices to enter 
into further polygynous marriages.88  
The choice argument was used in respect of the Hindu marriage which had 
not also been solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act in Singh v 
Ramparsad to deny a wife maintenance when she sued for divorce,89 but it 
was not used a year later in Govender v Ragavayah,90 when a Hindu wife 
applied to be included as a spouse for the purposes of the Intestate 
Succession Act. An explanation for Singh is that there had been no claims 
for divorce by any of the other groups of unmarried partners. The court may 
have been wary of applying the Divorce Act to marriages which are not 
legally valid.91 
The choice argument has thus far been used only in respect of unmarried 
opposite sex partnerships and in one Hindu marriage where the wife sued 
for divorce. This could indicate that courts recognise that the social contexts 
in which Muslim and same-sex couples find themselves would constrain 
their abilities to marry, but that the social and economic contexts of 
unmarried opposite-sex couples are not recognised. The inconsistency of 
this position is well illustrated by Kruuse's analysis of the 2007 judgment in 
Gory v Kolver, which retains the intestate succession rights of unmarried 
same-sex couples, despite the enactment of the Civil Union Act, which 
allows same-sex marriage. The result of this judgment,92 Kruuse contends, 
is that the social impediments which prevent same-sex couples from being 
married precludes the choice argument from applying to them, while those 
social and economic impediments which affect women's ability to enter into 
marriage are either regarded as non-existent or not serious enough to refute 
the choice argument. She argues that there can be no logical basis for such 
a hierarchy of oppression.93  
4.2.2 Formulating the choice 
By phrasing the choice in a particular way a court can determine to a large 
extent the outcome of its own enquiry. In the Volks and Meyer94 cases the 
choice was articulated as either getting married in order to access legal 
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benefits, or by remaining unmarried, to choose to forgo them. Formulated 
like this, the choice to access marital benefits can be made only by marriage 
and in no other way. 95 The particular formulation of the choice by the Volks 
majority judges may be the consequence of the limited discrimination 
argument – based on marital status only. An intersectional discrimination 
argument, aiming to achieve substantive gender equality could have curbed 
the majority's scope for formulating the choice in such a simplistic manner.  
In any event, this particular formulation of the choice is not inevitable. For 
instance, the court a quo in Robinson v Volks96 articulated the choice 
differently, asking whether, given the fact that the couple had lived together 
for a long time and shared their resources, they could thereby have chosen 
to forego the legal benefits, adding that there was no evidence that such a 
choice had actually been made. The court a quo therefore uses an "opt-out" 
model, which assumes that people would have chosen to acquire all 
available benefits unless they choose to forego them, while the 
Constitutional Court judgment uses an "opt-in" model, which assumes that 
people want none of the marital benefits unless they get married. This initial 
assumption is crucial and the opt-out model has been described as 
preferable.97 It also accords with the research which shows that people 
usually believe that their long-term cohabitation relationships will have legal 
consequences.98 
Another model of choice is found in Justice Sachs' minority judgment in 
Volks; he questions why the parties' choices to provide mutual support to 
one another should be disregarded.99 In other words, did the parties' sharing 
behaviour during the relationship indicate a choice to support one another? 
It is not obvious why the choice not to marry should be regarded as more 
significant than the choice to support one another during the relationship in 
determining whether there was a reciprocal duty of support.100 Given the 
real contexts of women's lives, it would be more accurate to articulate 
women's choice as being "between destitution, prostitution and loneliness 
on the one hand, and continuing cohabitation with a person who was 
unwilling or unable to marry them on the other."101 
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The way in which the choice is formulated by the majority in the Volks case 
evokes a curiously Victorian, punitive attitude towards the women who 
chose to cohabit, but who approach the courts to evade the consequences 
of their choices. According to Lind "[i]t is tempting to think of this problem as 
a problem of their own making, and its solution as one which was in their 
own hands".102 The majority in Volks appears to have fallen prey to this 
temptation. Yet, this reasoning can be said to:103 
discriminate against the powerless and economically dependent party, now 
threatened with destitution, on the basis that she should either have insisted 
on marriage or else withdrawn from the relationship. 
Even as this punitive notion of choice justifies existing discrimination, it fails 
to provide women with the real autonomy and real choices in respect of 
reproduction, childcare and family decisions which they have historically 
lacked.104 Lind105 describes the majority judgments as choosing not to 
alleviate the disadvantages faced by vulnerable female partners: 
While they were prepared to acknowledge the invidious gender based 
inequality operating in South Africa they perceived the task of alleviating that 
inequality to be so great — in the context of family relationships, at least — 
that they withdrew from their role in producing a solution. 
4.2.3  Who makes the choice?  
Refusing legal remedies on the basis of partners' supposed choices can be 
justified only if people actually make the choices described by the judges, 
and if they do so fully aware of the implications of their choices. This is not 
necessarily the case for many intimate partners, who may believe that the 
law attaches consequences to their long-term relationships, or who may 
erroneously believe that they are legally married when they are not.  
Studies on contract show that people who contract with one another, 
especially in intimate relationships, harbour unrealistically positive 
expectations about the duration of their relationships and the behaviour of 
their partners – they enter relationships under conditions of so-called 
"cognitive distortion". Lind cites studies in 2001, 2002 and 2005 showing 
that large numbers of cohabitants in the United Kingdom believe that the 
legal consequences of marriage apply to their long-term cohabitation 
relationships. He argues that South Africans, who are under the impression 
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that the new constitutional dispensation affords them extensive rights, are 
even more likely to think that they are legally protected.106  
The issue of choice is further complicated by the complex South African 
marital regimes where people, especially in customary marriages, may not 
realise that their marriages lack full legal validity.107 As a result of the 
continuation of the practice of migrant labour, women in customary 
relationships may be unaware that their partners had contracted other 
customary or civil marriages affecting the legal status of their own 
relationships. The assumption that they had made an informed choice to 
forego the legal benefits of marriage should therefore be thoroughly 
questioned in these circumstances. 
Even when people have perfect knowledge of the legal consequences of 
their actions, marriage requires the consent of both spouses. In the Volks 
case there was evidence that Mrs Robinson wanted to get married, but Mr 
Shandling did not. This is no coincidence. In patriarchal societies men are 
the ones who make the choices to marry and to discard spouses or long-
term partners,108 while women lack the social and economic power to 
coerce men to marry them. It usually suits men not to formalise their 
relationships by way of marriage, and thereby to avoid legal 
responsibilities.109 To reify the choice not to marry is, first, to pretend that 
this was the choice of both parties and, second, to give legal effect to the 
preference of the one who had the stronger bargaining power as a result of 
patriarchal privilege.110  
It is artificial to view a decision-making process that requires a meeting of 
minds between two individuals as generating a single 'choice'.111 
Lind112 therefore suggests that, in a situation where the parties want 
different things, the court should rather give effect to their modus vivendi – 
what they actually did during their relationship – which would more 
accurately represent the actual consensus which they reached during their 
relationship.  
Like the use of the choice argument itself, ascribing the choice of one party 
to both is also selectively done. In Hassam the Constitutional Court 
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remarked of Muslim wives that "[t]hese women, as was the case with the 
applicant, often do not have any power over the decisions by their husbands 
whether to marry a second or a third wife".113 Consistently applied, the 
choice argument would simply have been that a woman who did not want 
to live in a polygynous marriage should have chosen to divorce her 
husband. The failure to do so indicates her consent to the legal 
consequences.  
4.2.4 The economic and social contexts of choices  
The Constitutional Court has frequently pointed out the importance of 
historical, social and economic context in the unfair discrimination 
enquiry,114 and the majority in Volks acknowledged women's economic 
vulnerability and dependency within the family.115 However, in their 
reasoning on choice the majority failed to sustain the link between social 
context on the one hand and legal rules on the other hand. The majority also 
refused to admit empirical research by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies 
(CALS) on the socio-economic conditions of cohabiting women because it 
was regarded as insufficiently incontrovertible.116 The a-contextual nature 
of this judgment has been severely criticised by academics. 
Schäfer117 argues that the only context which the court took into account 
was whether there was a legal impediment to their marriage or not – that it 
replaced a concern with social context with a simple focus on legal context.  
Another way of viewing the choice argument in Volks is that it is not 
completely a-contextual, but is instead based on the contexts of the most 
privileged people, as if these were universally applicable to everyone.118 
The rejection of the CALS evidence allows the majority judgments to 
disregard the contexts of the most disadvantaged women. The majority 
judgments' notion of choice is therefore permeated with unacknowledged 
and invisible class and racial privilege.119 This tacit assumption of social and 
economic privilege justifies the "libertarian presumption of free choice".120  
                                            
113  Hassam case para 38. 
114  For instance Hassam case para 33. 
115  Volks case paras 64-69. 
116  Volks case paras 31-33. 
117  Schäfer 2006 SALJ 640. 
118  Bonthuys 2008 Can J Women & L 20. 
119  Bonthuys 2008 Can J Women & L 24. 
120  Goldblatt 2003 SALJ 616. 
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Justice Sachs' minority judgment in the Volks case draws attention to the 
past and present effects of racial and gender hierarchies on people's 
abilities practically to make the choice either to marry or not and to the 
legacy of Apartheid policies which created economic hardship and 
separated family members from one another.121 This position needs to be 
expanded and more explicitly articulated to highlight conditions which 
structure the choices of the most disadvantaged women. Courts should 
therefore take cognizance of the statistical and empirical evidence on the 
living arrangements of the majority of South Africans. This includes 
acknowledging the fact that the majority of South Africans, and particularly 
the most disadvantaged sector of the rural African poor, do not live 
according to Western paradigms of cohabitation or colonial legal concepts 
of marriage. Instead, there are multiple modes of and reasons for unmarried 
intimate partnerships in South Africa.122  
The family and reproductive lives of the majority of South Africans have the 
following characteristics:123  
 long-term unmarried intimate relationships; 
 multiple simultaneous relationships, often in rural and urban areas; 
 labour migration of both women and men from rural to urban areas; 
 no cohabitation or only sporadic cohabitation between intimate partners; 
 non-conjugal, non-nuclear households; 
 household membership doesn't necessarily indicate family status; 
 multi-generational households, often headed by women; 
 simultaneous and overlapping membership of multiple households; 
 overwhelming female responsibility to care for children and dependent family 
members; 
 adherence to customary concepts and processes of marriage and family 
formation; 
 disputes and uncertainty about the status of customary marriages; 
 blends of customary and civil elements in marriage; 
 gender inequality in access to land, economic opportunities, education and 
access to resources. 
The simplistic choice model adopted by the majority in Volks is hopelessly 
inadequate to capture the social, legal and moral complexities in unmarried 
intimate relationships. In its deliberate refusal to acknowledge the complex 
contexts of the real lives of the majority of South Africans, the choice 
argument reinforces the Apartheid and colonial disadvantages imposed on 
poor African, rural and unmarried women.  
                                            
121  Volks case paras 157, 162, 165. 
122  Goldblatt 2003 SALJ. 
123  See the discussion in para 2 of part I of this article. 
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4.2.5 Re-visiting the choice argument in the Laubscher case 
The Constitutional Court recently had two opportunities to re-visit the choice 
argument in the context of the Intestate Succession Act. The enactment of 
the Civil Union Act means that same-sex cohabitants can now marry, and a 
consistent application of the choice argument should therefore have 
precluded same-sex partners who choose not to marry from attaining 
marriage-like rights. In Gory v Kolver this question was easily skirted 
because the Civil Union Act was not in force at the time when one partner 
died intestate. The Constitutional Court held that the word "spouse" in the 
Act includes unmarried same-sex partners who had undertaken reciprocal 
duties of support. The remarks on the future use of the choice argument 
were therefore obiter dictum:124 
the rationale in previous court decisions for using reading-in to extend the 
ambit of statutory provisions applicable to spouses/married couples so as to 
include permanent same-sex life partners was that same-sex couples are 
unable legally to marry and hence to bring themselves within the ambit of the 
relevant statutory provision. Once this impediment is removed, then there 
would appear to be no good reason for distinguishing between unmarried 
heterosexual couples and unmarried same-sex couples in respect of intestate 
succession. 
The unmarried same-sex partners in the subsequent case of the Laubscher 
case could, however, have married in terms of the Civil Union Act and the 
question was whether the ruling in the earlier Gory case withstood the 
choice argument from Volks. While the majority of the Constitutional Court 
once again avoided dealing directly with the Volks argument by focusing on 
the scope of the Gory judgment,125 (distinguishing the issue of the 
maintenance of a surviving spouse in Volks from the issue of intestate 
succession in Laubscher126 and holding that the legislature deliberately did 
not, in the Civil Union Act, revoke the consequences of earlier jurisprudence 
awarding rights to cohabiting same-sex couples)127 Froneman J in his 
minority judgment decided to cut to the chase:128  
So this judgment meets Volks head-on, something I regard as inevitable. And 
it concludes that Volks cannot stand. 
Apart from disagreeing with the majority on other issues, the heart of the 
minority judgment lay in its acknowledgement that Volks discriminates 
                                            
124  Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC) para 29. 
125  Laubscher case paras 22-24. 
126  Laubscher case para 46. 
127  Laubscher case paras 38-40. 
128  Laubscher case para 60. 
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against unmarried same-sex and opposite sex couples who voluntarily 
undertake reciprocal duties of support.129 Froneman J explained that:130  
[t]he initial obvious way to change our society's views on unmarried 
partnerships was to show that they exhibited the same characteristics as 
married partnerships. Central to this was the existence of reciprocal duties of 
support between partners in both married and unmarried relationships. The 
most comfortable way to ease the road to equality was to remove the 
impediment of formal marriage to previous unmarried partners. But that was 
only a pragmatic start on the road we need to travel. The logic of similar 
reciprocal duties of support does not necessitate equalisation in that particular 
way. To the contrary, it creates a new form of unfair discrimination against 
unmarried couples who do not wish to marry. The same reciprocal duties of 
support remain, but some are protected, others still not. That residual unfair 
discrimination cannot be allowed to stand. 
There can be many points of criticism against this minority judgment. 
Characterising the Volks choice argument as an attempt to afford equal 
legal rights to all family forms strikes me as overly generous, given that this 
argument has not once been used to extend rights to opposite-sex 
cohabitants. It has benefitted same-sex partners and it has been mostly 
ignored for Muslim marriages. In the case of opposite-sex unmarried 
partners, however, the best that could be said is that the courts attempted, 
by way of this punitive approach to encourage people to attain rights by 
marriage. In cases where courts have extended rights – like Paixão – the 
issue of choice was ignored. Another problem with Froneman's judgment is 
that, like the Volks majority, he fails to provide a closely reasoned 
explanation of how and why the differentiation between married and 
unmarried couples amounts to unfair discrimination. Instead, he appears to 
regard the mere fact of different legal treatment as discriminatory. 
Nevertheless, the chink which it provides in the Constitutional Court 
solidarity on the Volks majority judgment presents a welcome opportunity 
for future litigation to dismantle the choice argument in its present form.  
5  Conclusion  
The aim of this series of two articles is to assess the efficacy of legal 
developments of the law of spousal maintenance to provide rights to support 
to the majority of South African women, who are African and often 
economically, educationally and socially disadvantaged. Social science 
research indicates that, as a result of the persistent consequences of 
Apartheid labour migrancy and other factors, these women's intimate 
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relationships differ from the monogamous spousal and cohabitation models 
which are usually assumed in legal reform projects. 
Part I addresses the development of the common law duty of spousal 
support by way of legislation and jurisprudence. I have argued that these 
developments, mainly in favour of Muslim spouses and unmarried same-
sex and opposite-sex cohabitants, are based either on the fact that the 
parties are married in terms of a major religion, or that their relationships 
closely resemble monogamous conjugal relationships, or else that they 
contractually undertook to support one another. None of these are likely to 
benefit disadvantaged African women whose intimate relationships don't fit 
the template of conjugality or co-residence. 
In Part II I therefore investigate other avenues to argue that the lack of a 
right to support for this group of women is unconstitutional and 
discriminatory. I formulate an argument that a right to support should be 
developed in customary and in common law. The argument that the lack of 
a duty of spousal support unfairly discriminates was rejected by the 
Constitutional Court in the Volks case. However, in that case the 
discrimination argument was based only on the ground of marital status. I 
argue that the lack of a right to support discriminates against the most 
disadvantaged and most numerous group of women on the intersectional 
grounds of marital status, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion, culture, 
socio-economic status and race. 
The opportunities for developing a customary duty to partner support are 
limited by the lack of a right to support after marriage and in unmarried 
intimate relationships. Research also indicates that customary communities 
are not sympathetic to the recognition of such rights. Nevertheless, 
empirical research could explore further possibilities in this area, including 
compensation for childrearing, the sharing of assets, and rights to land.  
Turning to the common law, there are two avenues for developing a duty of 
support: either ex lege duty or based on contract. In the Volks judgment the 
Constitutional Court appears to have effectively closed down the first 
avenue, so the idea of a contractual duty of support seems at first the more 
promising prospect.  
However, several rules and requirements of proof in contract law render it 
unsuitable for establishing a right to support for the most disadvantaged 
women, especially those whose relationships coexist with either customary 
or civil marriages. Moreover, the need to prove that a contract had been 
E BONTHUYS PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 31 
concluded in each individual case places this remedy out of reach of 
disadvantaged women.  
It therefore becomes necessary to confront the argument in Volks that the 
failure to marry indicates a voluntary choice to abandon the rights and 
remedies reserved for spouses. Choice has always had limited justificatory 
power in family law, which imposes many legal duties whether or not family 
members agree. Legally enforceable duties to maintain children, for 
instance, arise irrespective of parents' wishes or choices, as do all the other 
invariable consequences of marriage. Moreover, choice is selectively used 
in family law judgments. While courts have recognised that social and 
religious circumstances effectively precluded some women from choosing 
to marry, these circumstances were disregarded in other situations and in 
the Volks case itself.  Moreover, framing the choice as one of either getting 
married and thereby acquiring spousal rights and duties, or not getting 
married and thereby consciously relinquishing these rights, is questionable. 
Another issue is that many people are unaware of the legal consequences 
of not getting married, and in any event, the power to choose not to marry 
is not always equally shared by both partners, but probably belongs chiefly 
to the party with the stronger bargaining position.  
The choice argument should not apply to women in invalid customary 
marriages, because they would usually not be aware of the defects which 
render their marriages void, especially where the man is already involved in 
another customary or civil marriage. 
Given these issues, which have been pointed out repeatedly by many 
academic commentators, the time has come to re-visit the choice argument 
in Volks. The minority judgment by Froneman J in Laubscher v Duplan 
presents an opportunity for re-evaluation, which should be further 
developed in future jurisprudence.  
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